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The present paper outlines a perspective on Milgram’s obedience experiments informed by 
rhetorical psychology.  This perspective is demonstrated through a qualitative analysis of 
audio recordings and transcripts from two of Milgram’s experimental conditions: ‘voice-
feedback’ and ‘women as subjects’.  Analysis draws attention to the way in which 
participants could draw the experimenter into a process of negotiation over the continuation 
of the experimental session, something which could lead to quite radical departures from the 
standardized experimental procedure, and points to the ineffectiveness of Milgram’s fourth 
prod (‘You have no other choice, you must go on’).  These observations are discussed in 
terms of their implications for theory and research on dis/obedience, with a specific focus on 
the concepts of choice and agency and the nature and meaning of dis/obedience. 
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Milgram’s obedience experiments:  A rhetorical analysis 
It hardly needs to be stated that Milgram’s (1963, 1965a, 1974) obedience 
experiments are amongst the most influential and controversial studies in psychology.  They 
continue to stimulate a diverse range of empirical work (e.g. Burger, 2009; Burger, Girgis & 
Manning, 2011; Dambrun & Vatiné, 2010; Packer, 2008; Reeder, Monroe & Pryor, 2008), 
conceptual debate (e.g. De Vos, 2009; Haslam & Reicher, 2007; Passini & Morselli, 2009; 
Reicher & Haslam, 2011) and historical scholarship (Blass, 2004, 2009; Benjamin & 
Simpson, 2009; Russell, 2009, 2011), and are still regularly cited in discussions of atrocities 
and abuses both historical and contemporary (e.g. Fiske, Harris & Cuddy, 2004; Lankford, 
2009; Miller, 2004).  In this context it may perhaps seem that there is little new to say about 
the original experiments themselves, but I want to argue that a central aspect of Milgram’s 
obedience experiments has been largely neglected as a conventional image of the studies has 
crystallised and been transmitted to successive generations of social psychologists and the 
wider public.  The present paper concerns itself with the interactions that took place in 
Milgram’s obedience laboratory, with a specific focus on the use of rhetoric by the 
participants and by the experimenter, played so effectively by Milgram’s confederate, John 
Williams. 
 
The obedience experiments 
Of Milgram’s (1974) many experimental conditions, perhaps the most widely known 
are those which take a form similar to that portrayed at greatest length in his film, Obedience 
(Milgram, 1965b).  The basic procedure in these conditions involved a participant arriving at 
a laboratory, ostensibly to take part in a study concerning the effects of punishment on 
learning, and finding themselves caught up in a situation in which they took the role of 
‘teacher’ in a memory task.  This role required them to use what they were led to believe was 




an electric shock generator to inflict harm on another person, the ‘learner’, who they had seen 
being strapped into a chair in an adjacent room.  The learner provided answers to the memory 
test administered by the teacher, but as the experimental session went on the learner returned 
more and more incorrect answers, necessitating the administration of shocks increasing in 
15v increments, culminating in a shock of 450v.  As the shocks increased, the learner first 
began to cry out in apparent pain, and then following the 150v shock he demanded to be 
released.  Following this, the learner’s expressions of distress intensified, before he refused to 
answer any further questions following the 300v shock.  After the 330v shock, the learner’s 
protests ceased (Milgram, 1974). 
Unbeknownst to the participants, however, the learning experiment was simply a 
cover story, and the real aim of the study was to assess participants’ willingness to obey 
authority.  No harm was actually caused to the learner, who was in fact a confederate, and his 
protests had been pre-recorded.  Where participants appeared to be reluctant to continue, the 
experimenter used a series of four prods to instruct them to go on administering the electric 
shocks.  These prods, identified by Miller, Collins and Brief (1995, p. 3) as ‘the most 
important methodological feature in Milgram’s paradigm’, were as follows: 
Prod 1:  Please continue, or, Please go on. 
Prod 2:  The experiment requires that you continue. 
Prod 3:  It is absolutely essential that you continue. 
Prod 4:  You have no other choice, you must go on. 
(Milgram, 1974, p. 21, italics in original) 
In addition, the experimenter could use two extra prods to answer specific queries from 
participants as appropriate.  These were:  ‘Although the shocks may be painful, there is no 
permanent tissue damage, so please go on’ (ibid.) and ‘Whether the learner likes it or not, you 
must go on until he has learned all the word pairs correctly.  So please go on’ (ibid., p. 22).  




The four main prods were to be used in sequence, starting anew from prod 1 for each separate 
attempt at defiance, and only when all of these prods had been used was an experimental 
session discontinued. 
Milgram used two forms of dependent measure, both derived from the shocks 
administered:  the maximum shock delivered by participants, and a categorical variable, with 
participants recorded as either being obedient or defiant.  Obedience was operationalized as 
the use of the 450v switch on the shock generator, with participants who successfully ended 
their session at any point prior to pushing this lever being coded as defiant.  When conducted 
at Yale University, this basic procedure – sometimes with slight modifications – yielded 
obedience rates of 50% (condition 6 in Milgram, 1974), 62.5% (condition 2), and 65% 
(conditions 5 and 8).  When the location was switched to an office building in the town of 
Bridgeport (condition 10), with no apparent link to Yale, it yielded an obedience rate of 
47.5%. 
Although it is difficult to do justice to the nuances of Milgram’s work – and in 
particular to the many other experimental conditions based on this procedure – in such a short 
description, this summary nevertheless draws attention to some important features of 
Milgram’s procedure that will be discussed further below.  However, before moving onto the 
main thrust of my argument, it is first necessary to discuss briefly some attempts to provide a 
theoretical account of Milgram’s findings. 
 
Obedience:  Theoretical frameworks 
Milgram’s (1974) own attempt to theorise destructive obedience revolved around the 
concept of the agentic state.  Briefly, this account suggested that obedience relied upon 
people ceasing to view themselves as autonomous social actors, instead entering a 
psychological state in which their actions were controlled by some other agent.  However, 




numerous authors have noted that Milgram’s account is at best only partially supported by the 
available evidence (e.g. Blass, 2004; Miller, 1986), and subsequent attempts to develop a 
theoretical apparatus to explain Milgram’s findings have been similarly afflicted.  Indeed, 
Miller (2009, p. 21) recently suggested that in discussions of Milgram’s work, ‘[p]lausible 
ideas … are rampant, but somewhat vague and always numerous.’ 
The contrary perspectives apparent in attempts to develop a theoretical framework to 
explain Milgram’s findings can be illustrated through a brief discussion of two such 
endeavours.  Nissani (1990, p.1385) has argued that the limitations of the human cognitive 
system mean that ‘people cannot be counted on … to realize that a seemingly benevolent 
authority is in fact malevolent, even when they are faced with overwhelming evidence that 
this authority is indeed malevolent’.  In contrast, Russell (2009, p. 132) suggests that 
Milgram’s concept of the agentic state should be replaced by what he terms a state of 
autonomous denial:  ‘a state of mind in which subjects knew that they were most responsible 
for their own actions, but sensed the existence of opportunities that might enable them to 
avoid a confrontation with the experimenter and evade feeling and/or appearing personally 
responsible for electrocuting the learner.’  These contrasting attempts to account for 
Milgram’s findings thus differ on whether obedient participants in fact realised that what they 
were doing was morally problematic.  In Nissani’s account, the limitations of human thinking 
preclude a straightforward shift from viewing the experimenter as a fundamentally 
benevolent figure, whereas in Russell’s account the participants are fully aware of the 
morally opprobrious nature of their actions, but draw on a series of psychological 
mechanisms to enable them to deny their responsibility. 
In contrast to such attempts to develop an all-encompassing theory of destructive 
obedience, the present paper’s aims are more modest.  It is suggested that attempts to theorize 
the nature of obedience have tended to neglect an important aspect of the Milgram 




experiments – the actual interactions between participant and experimenter.  The present 
paper focuses in particular on the rhetorical character of these interactions in order to shift the 
focus of attention from the question of why many participants obeyed the experimenter, to 
how a substantial minority of them disobeyed the experimenter.  Many authors have pointed 
out that levels of disobedience in Milgram’s study have been generally neglected (e.g. 
Packer, 2008; Parker, 2007).  The present study seeks to develop this observation by noting 
that not only did some participants successfully extricate themselves from the experimental 
situation, but that they did so by negotiating and arguing their way out of it.  In short, they 
engaged in the creative and flexible use of rhetoric in order to resist the authority of the 
experimenter.  As will become apparent, once we begin to address this question, other 
avenues of inquiry are opened up, not least amongst which is the rhetorical nature of the 
experimenter’s contributions to the interactions in the experimental sessions. 
 
Rhetorical psychology 
The theoretical and methodological framework for the present analysis is provided by 
rhetorical psychology (Billig, 1991, 1996; Billig et al., 1988), a member of the wider family 
of discourse analytic methods (e.g. Potter, 2007; Potter & Wetherell, 1987).  Whilst not 
wishing to gloss over some important differences between these approaches, they adopt a 
common emphasis on the textual analysis of discursive materials within a broadly social 
constructionist epistemological framework (Potter, 1996; Potter & Hepburn, 2008) 
The specific focus of rhetorical psychology is on the identification of discursive 
strategies and lines of argument in discourse.  By paying close attention to the way in which 
language is used, it aims to specify the ways in which patterns of argumentation are related 
both to the immediate discursive context, and to the wider themes of cultural commonsense.  
Billig and his colleagues (Billig, 1991, 1996; Billig et al, 1988) have used this approach to re-




specify a number of core social psychological constructs – such as attitudes, categorization, 
and representations – as fundamentally rhetorical.  In this respect, the key point of departure 
for a rhetorical psychological analysis is the extent to which those constructs typically treated 
as relatively static psychological objects can be seen to be flexibly worked up by speakers in 
the process of argumentation.  In emphasising the centrality of argumentation, rhetorical 
psychology is not suggesting that we need only to explore contexts that might appear to be 
explicitly adversarial, but that the requirement to buttress claims and account for one’s 
practice is fundamental to even the most mundane areas of social life.  Crucially, Billig 
(1996) noted that every statement of a position, claim to truth, or formulation of an account 
carries with it the possibility of its own refutation, for the construction of any argument is a 
tacit acknowledgement that alternate propositions are possible.  Drawing on classical 
rhetorical scholarship, Billig termed these the logos and anti-logos of argumentation.  For 
every assertion (logos) there is the possibility of counter assertion (anti-logos) 
The broad field of discursive and rhetorical psychology has been characterized by 
extensive debate over theory and method, with the level of interactional detail to be 
incorporated into analysis being one of the key points of disagreement (see e.g. Billig, 1999; 
Schegloff, 1997, 1998, 1999; Wetherell, 1998).  For some – notably those influenced by 
conversation analysis – a focus on the details of interaction takes analytic priority.  For 
others, however, such an injunction to stick closely to the minute details of talk-in-interaction 
risks neglecting the way in which any particular moment of talk is situated within a wider 
discursive context. 
The present paper is not the place to rehearse these debates at length, but it should be 
noted that my analysis here draws on some of the insights of the more fine-grained 
approaches to discourse analysis, whilst attempting to retain a wider view of the situation of 
particular discursive episodes within the context of the whole experimental encounter.  Such 




an attempt to plot a course between two extremes can, of course, run the risk of failing to 
satisfy advocates of either.  However, it is notable that the original discourse analytic project 
of Gilbert and Mulkay (1984, p. 17) was articulated as occupying ‘a middle ground’ which 
constituted ‘part of an eclectic movement toward the systematic investigation of discourse in 
all areas of social life.’  Indeed, one of the appealing aspects of much early discourse analytic 
work in social psychology was its attempts to draw together a range of disparate traditions 
into a coherent whole.  In adopting the rhetorical psychological approach here, then, my 
intention is to signal a need to engage in analysis which – whatever the risks of ‘falling 
between two stools’ – attempts to marshal the analytic resources of both macro and micro-
focussed approaches. 
In order to illustrate the implications of this approach for our understanding of the 
Milgram experiments, the present article draws on the findings of a secondary analysis of 
materials held in the Stanley Milgram Papers at Yale University.  This archive holds audio 
recordings from most of Milgram’s experimental sessions.  Milgram (1974) presented many 
transcribed excerpts from the recordings, but given that at the time he was writing there were 
few established and generally accepted techniques for qualitative analysis within psychology, 
it is hardly surprising that rather than presenting any form of systematic qualitative analysis, 
Milgram used these excerpts essentially as anecdotal examples.  For instance, Milgram 
introduces one participant, who he identifies as a ‘Professor of Old Testament’, and 
reproduces the following extract from a transcript of this participant’s experimental session, 
which occurred after the participant had reached 150 volts on the shock generator: 
 
EXPERIMENTER:  It’s absolutely essential to the experiment that we continue. 
SUBJECT:  I understand that statement, but I don’t understand why the experiment is placed 
above this person’s life. 




EXPERIMENTER:  There is no permanent tissue damage. 
SUBJECT:  Well, that’s your opinion.  If he doesn’t want to continue, I’m taking orders from 
him. 
EXPERIMENTER:  You have no other choice, sir, you must go on. 
SUBJECT:  If this were Russia maybe, but not in America. 
(Milgram, 1974, p. 48) 
After this exchange, Milgram reports that the experimental session was discontinued, and 
goes on to point to the way in which the participant ‘initially justified his breaking off the 
experiment not by asserting disobedience but by asserting that he would then take orders 
from the victim’ (ibid., p. 49).  Although Milgram cautioned against taking the participants’ 
words at face value, in the absence of a clear framework in which to conceptualize this 
exchange, Milgram’s subsequent gloss can be read as treating the participant’s justification as 
indicative of some underlying psychological process or event:  ‘Thus, he speaks of an 
equivalence between the experimenter’s and the learner’s orders and does not disobey so 
much as shifts the person from whom he will take orders’ (ibid.).  If we are to suggest that a 
genuine shift in the source of authority has taken place, we must take the participants’ words 
at face value.  When he says ‘I’m taking orders from him’, the character of the participant’s 
actions must be seen as having undergone a significant change:  Whereas previously he had 
been obeying the experimenter, now he obeys the learner. 
In contrast, we might fruitfully conceptualise this utterance as part of a rhetorical 
strategy for extricating the participant from the experimental situation.  Indeed, when we 
place the utterance in the context of the participant’s whole speaking turn, we can begin to 
see how it is part of a more general rhetorical strategy of undermining the experimenter’s 
authority.  Significantly, the participant responds to the experimenter’s ‘There is no 
permanent tissue damage’ prompt with a classic rhetorical move which functions to 




undermine the facticity of the experimenter’s statement:  He glosses what has been offered as 
a statement of fact as merely an opinion, and thereby challenges the experimenter’s authority 
to pronounce on the physical effects of electric shocks.  In providing such a reading of the 
transcript, we have no need to seek to identify whether the participant really thinks that the 
experimenter’s statement about tissue damage is simply a matter of opinion, nor need we be 
concerned with whether the participant undergoes some sort of psychological shift from 
obeying the orders of the experimenter to obeying the participant.  What is crucial is that 
these utterances perform a particular rhetorical function in the local context of their use.  
They enable the participant to subvert the experimenter’s authority, and in so doing provide a 
potential ‘way out’ of the experimental situation. 
As argued above, it is not surprising that Milgram did not develop the implications of 
such observations himself given that he was working prior to what some authors have termed 
‘the turn to language’ in the social sciences (see e.g. Kroger & Wood, 1998).  However, 
given the developments in qualitative methodologies which have occurred since Milgram’s 
work was published (e.g. Madill & Gough, 2008; Rennie, Watson & Monteiro, 2002), it is 
perhaps more notable that the continued recognition of the significance of Milgram’s research 
has yet to stimulate secondary qualitative analysis of his data. 
One partial exception to this is provided by Modigliani and Rochat (1995) who 
argued that the lack of clear understanding of Milgram’s findings may be due to the neglect 
of interaction in the encounter between participant and experimenter.  Specifically, they argue 
that, ‘[i]n the time between the initial command and the final outcome (obedient or defiant), 
subjects are engaged in a continuous social interaction with the authority, the victim, and any 
others who may be present.  At particular moments this interaction itself may bring them 
closer to, or farther from, obedience’ (Modigliani & Rochat, 1995, p. 108).  Modigliani and 
Rochat (1995, p. 113) developed a hypothesis that ‘[t]he earlier in the procedure subjects 




begin to resist notably, the more likely they will be to end up defiant’ (italics in original) and 
tested this through a content analysis of recordings of the Bridgeport condition (Milgram, 
1974, experiment 10).  Modigliani and Rochat found support for their hypothesis, with their 
analysis suggesting that the earlier a participant explicitly began to resist the experimenter’s 
commands (e.g. by questioning him, or objecting to the experiment), the more likely they 
were ultimately to successfully break off their participation in the experiment. 
Modigliani and Rochat’s key contribution is to draw attention to the way in which 
participants could facilitate their disengagement from the experiment by challenging and 
questioning the experimenter at an early stage.  In this respect, we might suggest that the key 
to defiance is to frame the encounters as occasions for rhetoric – those who began to engage 
in argument during the earlier stages of the experiment in effect set out their stall and began 
building their arguments for the cessation of the experiment much sooner than those who 
were more reticent.  Although this emphasis on interaction in the Milgram experiments 
represents an important advance on some previous conceptual analyses, Modigliani and 
Rochat’s perspective ultimately fails to fully engage with the rhetorical nature of the 
interactions, and, crucially, they are not concerned with either the content or structure of the 
actual arguments constructed by participants in their attempts to extricate themselves from 
the experiments.  Finally, their analysis potentially misses the rhetorical character of the 
experimenter’s utterances.  Notably, Modigliani and Rochat suggest that the role of the 
experimenter is analogous to that of a parent seeking to impose their authority on a child:  
‘There is no effort to persuade – only to firmly remind subordinates of their well-known 
obligations’ (p. 114).  The present paper seeks to focus on these issues by exploring the use 
of rhetoric in two of Milgram’s conditions. 
 
Milgram’s conditions 02 and 20 




Conditions 02 and 20 make a particularly good starting point for the analysis of 
rhetoric in the Milgram experiments as they represent some of the best available ‘baseline’ 
data from the experiments.  Condition 02 was labelled the ‘Voice-Feedback’ condition by 
Milgram (1974), and used the procedure described above.  Condition 20, labelled ‘Women as 
Subjects’ and reported as experiment 8 by Milgram (1974), was the sole experimental 
condition in which women participated.
1
  This condition also used the basic procedure 
described above, although in addition the learner disclosed a mild heart condition as he was 
being strapped in to the chair, and subsequently referred to this in some of his protests. 
As for most of Milgram’s conditions, a range of materials from conditions 02 and 20 
are held in the Stanley Milgram Papers at Yale University’s Archives and Manuscripts 
Service.  Data accessed for the present paper include ‘subject files’ for each participant, 
which consist of demographic information, completed post-experiment and follow-up 
questionnaires, as well as notes made on participants’ performance during the experiment.  
Most importantly, however, the archives contain audio recordings of many of the 
experimental sessions, some of which also include the post-experiment debrief and interview, 
and a certain amount of pre- and post-experiment discussion amongst Milgram and his 
confederates.  Although some recordings are missing from the archives, it was possible to 
access a total of 39 (out of 40) experimental sessions from condition 02, and 31 (also out of 
40) from condition 20.  These recordings were transcribed by the author in order to allow for 
a qualitative analysis of the rhetorical dynamics of the experimental sessions.
2
 
Within the constraints of the present paper the empirical examples must necessarily be 
limited.  Rather than reporting a full analysis of these data, the present discussion instead 
seeks to draw attention to two related aspects of the interactions.  First, through the use of a 
case example from one particular participant in condition 02, I want to explore how 
participants’ rhetorical strategies could draw the experimenter away from the standardized 




script of the experiment.  Second, I want to highlight the sorts of questions that this style of 
analysis might be used to address by attempting to settle a question concerning the 
effectiveness of the prods – and of one prod in particular – in eliciting obedience from the 
participants. 
 
Rhetoric in the obedience lab:  A case example 
Condition 02 is part of the early proximity series of experiments initially reported in 
Milgram (1965a).  Russell (2009) has suggested that the proximity series should perhaps have 
been treated as an extension of Milgram’s pilot studies as he was yet to settle on the final 
standardized procedure.  For present purposes it is notable that the flexibility that the yet-to-
be finalized procedure affords the experimenter provides interesting material for the study of 
rhetoric in the obedience lab.  Notably, this points to the importance of rhetoric in the 
experimenter’s, as well as the participants’, utterances. 
These points can be illustrated through an extended example from experimental 
session 0208.  As the participant seeks initially to place conditions on his continued 
participation in the experimental session, and ultimately to negotiate his way out of it, the 
experimenter seeks to elicit the continued compliance of the teacher.  The exchange reported 
in the following extract begins with the teacher about to administer the 120v shock following 
an incorrect response: 
Extract 1a (Participant 0208) 
1 T: I’m going to administer a hundred and twenty 
2  volts. 
3  ((SHOCK)) 
4 L: URGH!  Hey these really hurt. 
5  (3) 




6 T: I don’t think I wanna, be a part of this anymore. 
7  (2) 
8 E: Please continue. 
9 T: No. 
10  (11) 
11 E: It’s absolutely essential that you go on. 
12  (2) 
13 T: Well if he says it’s all right it’s all right with me 
14  will you ask him if he wants to go on? 
15  (3) 
16 E: Whether the learner likes it or not er, we must 
17  continue. 
18 T: I wouldn’t contin- 
19 E: ((inaudible))- 
20 T: I wouldn’t continue without asking him. 
21  (2) 
22 E: As I explained to both er, er to him when you were 
23  there, er although the shocks may be extremely 
24  painful there is no permanent tissue damage. 
25 T: Well I still th- I still don’t want to go on unless he 
26  says all right. 
 
The participant’s initial attempt to begin to extricate himself from the experiment is notable 
insofar as it consists not of a straightforward request to stop or a refusal to continue, but 
instead is framed as a report of his current thinking (l. 6:  ‘I don’t think I wanna, be a part of 




this anymore).  The way in which this functions to hedge the participant’s initiation of an 
attempt to bring about the cessation of the experiment is perhaps not surprising given the 
potentially face-threatening act in which he is engaging.  Indeed, many authors have noted 
that participants often seemed to go to great lengths to appear polite in the experiments (e.g. 
Milgram, 1974; Russell, 2009).  In this respect, this opening attempt to negotiate the 
cessation of the session places the onus on the experimenter to respond in an appropriate 
manner.  Of course, the experimenter does no such thing and instead uses the first prod (l. 8), 
which is met with a straightforward denial from the participant, followed by a long silence.  
The experimenter’s subsequent use of prod 3 (l. 11) occasions an interesting rhetorical 
manoeuvre from the teacher, who places a condition on his continued participation, namely 
that he will continue if the learner also wishes to continue (ll. 13-14).  The experimenter 
responds to this with an adapted version of one of the special prods (ll. 16-17) which 
positions the learner’s wishes as irrelevant to the continuation of the experiment.  Following a 
re-statement of the participant’s condition for continuation (l. 20), the experimenter utilises a 
further special prod (ll. 22-23), but neither this, nor the preceding prod, satisfies the condition 
placed by the participant, who re-states it again on lines 25-26. 
 We can thus begin to see how the experimenter’s goal of eliciting obedience using the 
experimental prompts can be frustrated by a participant engaging in what Billig (1996) has 
termed ‘witcraft’; the creative use of rhetoric to suit the demands of the particular 
argumentative context in which one finds oneself.  The participant in this session has engaged 
the experimenter in a process of negotiation concerning the conditions for the continuation of 
the experiment.  At this point, the experimenter looks to be defeated, having used what 
appears to be his most suitable pre-prepared rhetorical strategy against this particular 
argument (i.e. the special prod used on ll. 16-17), and we might expect a fairly swift 
procession through the final prod (‘You have no other choice…’) to be met with steadfast 




resistance from a participant stubbornly sticking to his argument.  However, it is perhaps 
significant to note that in arriving at this point the experimenter has in fact missed out prod 2 
(‘The experiment requires that you continue’), moving instead from prod 1 (l. 8) to prod 3 (l. 
11) prior to the use of the two special prods.  There thus appears to be more flexibility in the 
procedure than is typically assumed in most discussions of the Milgram experiments, 
something which is confirmed by the events which follow immediately after: 
Extract 1b (Participant 0208) 
27  (52) ((During this time period movement can be 
28  heard, and what sounds like a door shutting. 
29  From what follows it seems reasonable to  
30  presume that E went out of the room, ostensibly 
31  to ask L if he wished to continue)) 
32 E: He seems willing enough to go on so please 
33  continue. 
34  (8) 
35 T: Wet, night, grass, duck, cloth. 
 
Although it is difficult to be sure exactly what occurred at this point given the absence of 
visual information necessitated by the reliance on audio recordings, the experimenter breaks 
the silence with an attempt to reassure the teacher that the learner ‘seems willing enough to 
go on’.  This attempt to convince through an appeal to privileged insider information gained 
by virtue of an apparently back-stage consultation with the learner is successful in eliciting 
obedience from the teacher, who continues with the memory test and goes on to administer 
two further shocks.  However, the second of these is the 150v shock, following which the 
learner demands to be released.  As shown in extract 1c, the participant then begins a further 
attempt at disobeying the experimenter.  At this point, it is notable that in the subsequent 




exchange the experimenter draws upon the visit to the learner as a rhetorical resource in order 
to attempt to elicit obedience from the teacher: 
Extract 1c (Participant 0208) 
59 L: Experimenter! Get me out of here!  I won’t be in 
60  the experiment any more.  I refuse to go on, let 
61  me out! 
62 E: Please continue. 
63 T: Not under those conditions.  Not with him 
64  hollering. 
65 E: I just checked on him, and he er, seemed pretty 
66  willing to continue so please continue. 
67 T: No not unless I think, you see he’s hollering in 
68  there it’s just er 
69  (16) 
70 E: It’s absolutely essential that you continue. 
71 T: Well I’m not gonna continue with the man 
72  hollering that he wants to get out of there I mean 
73  er (2) it might be essential to you but it’s not that 
74  essential for me. 
75  (3) 
76 E: I was just in there and he seemed willing enough 
77  to continue. 
78 T: Well, that’s what he says but you know it’s not 
79  er 
80  (14) 




81 E: ((inaudible)) 
82 T: I mean i- I’d be glad to walk in there if he says to 
83  me go on I’ll go on but I’m not going to go on 
84  with the man hollering in there to stop. 
85 E: You have no other choice you must go on. 
86 T: Well I don’t say that I mean I’m just not gonna go on 
87  unless he says to go on. 
88 E: Well we’ll have to discontinue the experiment then. 
 
The participant uses several rhetorical strategies here in order to bring the experiment to an 
end.  Notably, he draws attention to the learner’s ‘hollering’ (l. 64; l. 67; l. 72), as well as 
particularizing the experimenter’s use of prod 3 by drawing a contrast between the 
experiment’s importance for the experimenter and for himself (ll. 73-4).  Finally, he places a 
further condition on his continued participation to the effect that he will only continue if he 
can receive an assurance himself from the learner that he wishes to continue.  However, of 
greater interest here are the rhetorical strategies employed by the experimenter, and 
specifically the way in which the supposed discussion between experimenter and learner is 
invoked in an attempt to elicit obedience (ll. 65-6; ll. 76-7).  It is instructive to consider this 
in greater detail. 
The teacher’s firm refusal to continue on ll. 63-4 is met with a novel rhetorical move 
by the experimenter, who mobilises his back-stage discussion to emphasise that the learner 
was apparently willing to continue.  However, faced with the learner’s demand to be released, 
this assertion is less clear-cut than it was in extract 1b.  Although the experimenter 
emphasises the recency of the encounter (l. 65:  I just checked on him…) as if to highlight the 
oddity of the learner’s volte-face, his shift to the past tense (checked; seemed) allows for the 
learner’s willingness to continue to be superseded by his present demand to be released.  The 




participant again refuses, before a long silence ensues which is broken by the experimenter 
using prod 3 (l. 70).  The participant then utilises the contrast between the experimenter’s 
argument that the learner had seemed ‘pretty willing to continue’, and the learner’s own 
demands to be released.  Thus, the participant does not simply invoke the learner’s 
‘hollering’, but specifically his ‘hollering that he wants to get of there’ (l. 72). 
The participant in this exchange successfully draws the experimental session to a 
close despite these departures from the experimenter’s script.  Nevertheless, the 
experimenter’s excursion to apparently speak to the learner yielded two further shocks from 
the teacher before the learner’s demand to be released galvanized the participant’s argument 
to end the session.  This exchange therefore demonstrates how both obedience and defiance 
can be understood as rhetorical processes.  The participant seeks to provide arguments for 
why the experiment should be stopped, and the experimenter provides arguments for why the 
experiment must continue.  The experimenter’s arguments consist of a mixture of pre-
prepared and improvised rhetorical strategies, and it is notable that the physical act of leaving 
the laboratory functions rhetorically as well, such that the persuasiveness of the experimenter 
is a joint function of both his physical and discursive actions. 
The strategy of leaving the room was employed in two further experimental sessions 
in the data analysed for the present paper, eliciting two further shocks from participant 0219, 
and seven further shocks from participant 0237.  Although all three participants on whom the 
strategy was used were ultimately defiant, they nevertheless continued to administer shocks 
for longer than they might otherwise have done had the strategy not been used. 
This analysis of 0208’s ultimately successful attempts at defiance draws attention to 
the rhetorical character of the experimenter’s attempts to elicit obedience.  The strategy of 
leaving the room ostensibly to speak to the learner may not be part of the standardized 
procedure as conveyed in Milgram’s publications, but this is not to imply that it is only 




departures from standardization that function rhetorically.  The pre-scripted prods can also be 
analysed for their rhetorical function, and in terms of the counter-arguments they elicited 
from participants. 
 
You have no other choice… 
While discussions of the obedience experiments routinely draw attention to the role of 
the experimenter’s prods, there has as yet been no systematic attempt to explore how they 
were used in practice in the experimental sessions.  For present purposes, I will focus on prod 
4:  ‘You have no other choice, you must go on’ (Milgram, 1974, p. 21, italics in original).  
This is significant for a number of reasons.  First, it is the only one of the scripted prods to 
explicitly enlist the concept of choice.  This is potentially important given the centrality of 
notions of autonomy and agency to Milgram’s theoretical framework.  Second, there are 
conflicting perspectives regarding whether we might expect this prod to have been 
particularly good at eliciting obedience.  Referring to prod 4, Miller (2009, p. 25), has argued 
that, ‘[t]aken literally and out of context, these words are clearly preposterous.  They violate 
any reasonable sense of ethics.  In context, of course, they appear to have had considerable 
persuasive force’.  It is notable that Miller suggests only that these words appear to have 
been so persuasive – no firmer statement is possible as there has yet to be empirical analysis 
at a detailed enough level to be able to establish whether the prod did indeed play such a key 
role in the elicitation of obedience. 
In contrast, a recent analysis of the effectiveness of the four prods as used in Burger’s 
(2009) partial replication of the Milgram paradigm suggests that the fourth prod may in fact 
be particularly ineffective at eliciting obedience (Burger et al., 2011).  In Burger et al.’s 
analysis, no participants continued with the experimental procedure after having received the 
fourth prod.  Burger et al suggest that this raises questions as to whether the Milgram 




paradigm can be said to be a demonstration of obedience.  Similarly, Reicher and Haslam 
(2011, p. 167) suggest that ‘the question of whether or not people obey this fourth prompt is 
decisive in establishing the validity of those interpretations of Milgram’s studies that see 
them as a demonstration of how people follow orders.’ 
 In an attempt to settle this debate, all uses of prod 4 in the transcripts from conditions 
02 and 20 were identified.  The first, and perhaps most striking, observation to note is just 
how ineffective prod 4 appears to have been.  The prod was used for 23 participants across 
these two conditions, yet it occasioned further shocks from only two of these participants 
(one in each condition), only one of whom subsequently proceeded to be fully obedient (the 
other delivered only one further shock before successfully disobeying).  Although it is of 
course possible that the prod was more effective in other experimental conditions, at the very 
least the suggestion that prod 4 had ‘considerable persuasive force’ (Miller, 2009, p.25) is 
challenged by further examination of the experimental interactions themselves in these two 
conditions. 
 This leads to the question of how precisely the participants resisted prod 4.  In order 
to address this, it is worth considering some actual examples of the prod in use.  As might be 
expected, participants responded to the experimenter’s use of prod 4 in a variety of ways, but 
the most common (N = 12) response was to employ a strategy of straightforward rhetorical 
negation.  For example: 
Extract 2 (Participant 2032; 270v/225v
3
) 
1 E: You have no other choice you must continue. 
2 T: I have another choice.  I won’t continue. 
3 E: Then we’ll have to discontinue the, er, the 
4  experiment. 
 




The participant’s assertion that she does indeed have a choice and will not continue simply 
dismisses the definition of the situation provided by the experimenter’s use of prod 4.  
Following the experimental procedure to the letter, the experimenter subsequently makes no 
further attempt to elicit obedience, and draws the experimental session to a close.  By 
conceptualizing the experimenter’s use of prod 4 as a rhetorical move, we can see how it in 
fact contains within it the very ingredients for its own refutation.  Such a bald assertion of 
lack of choice tacitly makes available the powerful anti-logos of choice.  Although this was 
the most straightforward version of this form of rebuttal, others used slightly more complex 
variations of it.  Three participants combined their assertion of choice with an offer to return 
the cheque they had received for their participation.  For example, consider the following 
exchange: 
 
Extract 3 (Participant 2036; 450v
4
) 
1 E: You have no other choice you must [continue.] 
2 T:               [Oh I]  
3  certainly do have you can have your cheque back 
4  sir. 
5 E: No th- er, you, the cheque is yours simply for 
6  coming to [the lab.] 
7 T:       [I don’t] even care about that money I 
8  don’t need it that bad.  And I’m not going on until 
9  I know that man is all right.  That’s all 
10  ((inaudible)) you go and look at him. 
11 E: Well we’ll have to discontinue the experiment. 
 




Here we see the experimenter use the assertion that the cheque is ‘yours simply for coming to 
the lab’ to frame the cheque as unimportant.  The experimenter’s use of this argument 
(though not officially part of the standardized script) was methodologically important as it 
allowed Milgram to rule out financial reward as a contributing factor in obedience.  However, 
in the context of 2036’s experimental session it also functions rhetorically to negate the 
participant’s grounds for her ‘choice’.  This is met by the counter-assertion from the 
participant that the money is similarly unimportant to her, with a further argument which 
makes her continuation contingent on the establishment of the well-being of the learner (ll. 8-
9).  It is only following this shift to a different rhetorical strategy that the experimenter 
discontinues the session. 
 Other participants (N = 4) sought to engage the experimenter directly by asking for 
further justification of his assertion that they had ‘no choice’: 
 
Extract 4 (Participant 2005; 180v) 
1 E: You have no choice, really. 
2 T: Why? 
3 E: W- 
4 T: You mean I can’t get up and leave? 
5 E: Certainly but I mean if you er, if you don’t go on 
6  we’ll have to discontinue the entire, test you see. 
7 T: Well, you can find someone else and do the same 
8  thing over again.  Well, I’m sorry. 
9 E: Well we’ll hav- it’s all right.  We’ll have to 
10  discontinue. 
 




It is notable that the experimenter’s use of prod 4 here varies from the scripted version, and 
appears markedly weaker as a result.  Specifically, the use of ‘really’ marks this not as a 
simple assertion of lack of choice, but as a contingent claim.  The participant’s questioning of 
the experimenter on lines 2 and 4 occasions a clarification from the experimenter that 
effectively retracts the ‘no choice’ prod by acknowledging that a choice is indeed available – 
the participant can leave but this will result in the termination of the experiment.  Even here, 
the experimenter employs a rhetorical device known as extreme case formulation (ECF; 
Pomerantz, 1986) in order to construct the results of discontinuation as particularly 
problematic – the consequence of the participant leaving is thus glossed as the 
discontinuation of ‘the entire, test’ (l. 6).  This is mitigated by the participant, who suggests 
recruiting another participant and ‘do[ing] the same thing over again’ (ll. 7-8). 
 This tactic of challenging the experimenter directly by demanding further explanation 
of his remarks essentially resulted in the modification or retraction of prod 4, such that the 
experimenter weakened his rhetorical position as he went from a bald assertion that the 
participant had ‘no choice’, to an acknowledgement that they did indeed have a choice.  This 
backtracking on the part of the experimenter is most starkly illustrated in participant 0228’s 
session: 
 
Extract 5 (Participant 0228; 300v)
5
 
1 E: You have no other choice you must go on. 
2 T: Why?  The man doesn’t wa- I don’t er, I don’t 
3  want to do anymore, to the man, the man’s yelling 
4  I can’t er I can’t take it.  I don’t like to hear 
5  anybody yell.  That’s how I am. 
6 E: The experiment requires that you go on.  Please 




7  continue. 
8  (21) 
9 T: Three hundred and fifteen volts. 
10  (3) 
11 T: Well what happens if I don’t continue with this I 
12  just walk out? 
13  (2) 
14 E: That’s your prerogative.  But it is essential, that 
15  you continue. 
16  (3) 
17 E: Please continue. 
18  (8) 
19 T: No I- I- I- I- look I can’t, I can’t do it.  I’m going 
20  to have to go.  I’m very sorry. 
21 E: Well, we’ll have to discontinue the experiment 
 
The participant’s initial question (l. 2:  ‘Why?’) is followed by an argument against 
continuing which is predicated on the learner’s refusal to continue and the participant’s own 
character (ll. 4-5:  ‘I can’t take it.  I don’t like to hear anybody yell.  That’s how I am.’).  On 
this occasion, the experimenter does not backtrack immediately, but instead uses prod 2.  
After a long gap of 21 seconds, the participant states the next voltage level to be administered 
(l. 9), but instead of delivering the shock he pauses again, and asks a further question 
concerning the consequences of him ‘just walk[ing] out’ (ll. 11-12).  Instead of denying the 
participant’s choice, the experimenter’s response on line 14 explicitly affirms that it is the 
participant’s ‘prerogative’ to discontinue the experiment.  He then uses a version of prod 3 




(ll. 14-15:  ‘it is essential, that you continue’), and, following a pause, a further ‘Please 
continue’.  After another lengthy silence, the participant essentially exercises his 
‘prerogative’ and states that he ‘is going to have to go’ (ll. 19-20), at which point the session 
is discontinued. 
When faced with prod 4, most participants therefore responded either by asserting that 
they did indeed have a choice, or by engaging with the experimenter in such a way that he 
ultimately acknowledged that they did have a choice.  We can understand these interactions 
as rhetorical struggles over the definition of the situation, and over the definition of the 
participant’s own psychological state.  Prod 4 can therefore be understood as a logos which 
potentially makes available a powerful anti-logos, which participants were generally able to 
use:  that in this situation they do have a choice. 
 
Concluding remarks 
The primary contribution of this approach to our understanding of the Milgram 
experiments is to draw attention to the importance of rhetoric in the interactions between 
experimenter and participant, with the experimenter essentially trying to argue the case for 
the continuation of the experiment, and the participant seeking to provide counter-arguments 
in favour of the cessation of the experimental session.  To conclude, it is worth briefly 
discussing the implications of these observations for our understanding of the Milgram 
experiments. 
The analysis raises questions about the meaning of obedience within discussions of 
the Milgram experiments.  In highlighting the rhetorical nature of the experimenter’s role in 
the experiments, the present analysis points to the intriguing possibility that the studies 
ultimately may have little to do with obedience as conventionally understood (see also Burger 
et al., 2011; Reicher & Haslam, 2011).  It is notable that the experimenter’s responses to 




participants who appear reluctant to continue do not take the form of orders designed to elicit 
obedience, but are instead arguments designed to convince and persuade.  Indeed, the most 
order-like interventions appear to have been overwhelmingly resisted.  However, a further 
complicating factor arises from considering conversation analytic findings on requests and 
invitations (e.g. Drew, 1984; Kitzinger & Frith, 1999).  To suggest that people are only 
‘obeying’ if the utterance which elicits their ‘obedience’ can be shown to be a grammatical 
‘order’ may be problematic.  Discursive actions (e.g. requests, invitations, refusals, etc.) are 
often made without formulating an utterance as a grammatical request, invitation, refusal, and 
so on.  For example, a statement such as ‘It’s rather warm in here’ can function as a request 
insofar as it is oriented to by those in the room as a request for a window to be opened. 
Rather than suggesting that the Milgram experiments can no longer be seen as a 
demonstration of obedience, an alternative way of re-conceptualising them might therefore be 
to re-orient our understanding of obedience to incorporate actions elicited in the absence of a 
direct order.  This would lead to the conclusion that Milgram’s experimenter manages to 
elicit obedience without issuing direct orders, and that when direct orders are issued, 
obedience fails.  Ultimately, however, this is an issue of analytic definition which risks 
neglecting the way in which terms such as ‘obedience’ might themselves be used rhetorically.  
An alternative perspective would be to topicalize invocations of ‘obedience’ as an object of 
analytic scrutiny themselves.   
Such an analysis is beyond the scope of the present paper, but points to the need for 
further empirical work on this issue.  It is nevertheless important to note that – whatever 
might or might not be said about what constitutes ‘obedience’ – the analysis presented here is 
suggestive of the failure of direct orders to elicit the participants’ continuation with the 
experimental procedure.  The analysis of the experimenter’s fourth prod raises some 
interesting possibilities regarding the invocation of ‘choice’ and autonomy in the 




experiments.  As noted above, Milgram’s own theoretical framework conceptualized 
dis/obedience as a psychological tussle between individual autonomy and seeing the self as a 
vehicle for the agency of an authority figure (the agentic state).  The present approach 
focuses instead on the way in which choice and related constructs were rhetorically 
negotiated by the protagonists in the experimental sessions themselves.  This directs our 
attention to the way in which autonomy is as much a social discursive accomplishment as a 
private psychological object (Edwards & Potter, 1992).  As noted above, in framing the 
continuation of the experiment explicitly within a rhetorical strategy of (lack of) choice, prod 
4 makes available a counter argument, or anti-logos, revolving around the capacity to 
exercise choice.  In short, a useful alternative to theoretical debate concerning autonomy and 
agency in the Milgram experiments might be provided by attending to the ways in which the 
protagonists in the studies themselves argued about such matters.  Whatever might, or might 
not, be said about underlying psychological states and processes, defiant participants were 
able to seize on the experimenter’s invocation of choice as part of their rhetorical armoury to 
extricate themselves from the experiment. 
This argument begs the question of why the counter-argument to prod four was seized 
upon so readily.  It is instructive, if necessarily somewhat speculative, to relate these 
observations to western – and particularly US – discourses of individualism, which 
emphasise personal autonomy and freedom of choice (see e.g. Bauman, 2001; Sampson, 
1993).  In this respect, it is notable that the ‘Professor of Old Testament’ quoted by Milgram 
(1974) (see above) explicitly invokes his location in ‘America’ as grounds for resisting prod 
4.  As numerous authors have noted (e.g. Foucault, 1979; Rose, 1999), the subjects of 
capitalist liberal individualism are not governed through the direct administration of blunt 
disciplinary authority, but are instead shaped to become self-disciplining subjects.  We might 
therefore suggest that, rather than providing a striking demonstration of the power of 




‘obedience’, Milgram’s experiments are testament to the overwhelming failure of 
straightforward attempts to elicit ‘obedience’ in the face of powerful ideologies of autonomy.  
This is not, of course, to deny that the majority of participants in the conditions explored here 
did indeed proceed to the highest level of the shock generator, but to suggest that they did so 
without having to be compelled to do so by direct commands from the experimenter. 
The reliance on transcripts made from audio recordings, borne out of necessity, raises 
an intriguing point about the nature of rhetoric itself.  Specifically, rhetoric can be bodily as 
well as discursive.  In extract 1b, the physical act of leaving the room, apparently to check the 
learner’s willingness to continue, is just as much a rhetorical move as is the articulation of a 
discursive utterance.  Similarly, the kinetic metaphor of the rhetorical move is apt here, as it is 
just as much a rhetorical move as it is a physical move – in order to convince, the 
experimenter’s words must appear credible, and for this to be the case he must leave the 
room.  In this sense, the present analysis points the way not only to a rhetorical perspective 
on the Milgram studies, but to the possibility of a widening of the scope of what we might 
understand as being rhetorical.  Not only are words used to convince and persuade, but so too 
are physical actions.  This resonates with recent attempts to draw attention to the neglect of 
embodiment in social psychology (e.g. Lyons & Cromby, 2010; Potter & Hepburn, 2008), 
and whilst the present paper is not the place to begin to flesh out the details of how such a 
perspective on rhetoric might further expand our view of the Milgram experiments, it is a 
potentially fruitful avenue for future research.  For instance, Milgram (1974) noted that on 
many occasions participants initiated defiance not only by speaking, but by physically 
moving away from the table at which they were sitting whilst administering the learning test. 
The analysis also has implications for our understanding of standardization in the 
Milgram experiments (see also Darley, 1995; Modigliani & Rochat, 1995; Russell, 2009).  It 
is striking that the rhetorical strategies employed by the experimenter depart sometimes quite 




substantially from the official experimental script.  This is quite understandable given the 
problems inherent in trying to determine in advance the range of possible questions and 
challenges one might be faced with, but it does suggest that the conventional view of the 
experimental procedure as highly standardized needs to be revised.  Even where the standard 
prods are used, they are not necessarily used in the correct order (e.g. extract 1a), or in the 
standard form (e.g. extract 4), and they sometimes contravene Milgram’s (1974, p. 21) 
assertion that ‘[t]he sequence was begun anew on each occasion that the subject balked or 
showed reluctance to follow orders’ (e.g. extract 5). 
In making these points, the aim is not to engage in methodological criticism and 
suggest that we can no longer treat Milgram’s findings from these conditions as reliable 
because of the departures from standardization.  Instead, it is my contention that these 
sometimes quite radical departures point to the importance of developing a perspective on 
Milgram’s experiments – and indeed on dis/obedience more broadly – that is founded upon 
the rhetorical nature of encounters with authority.  Moreover, in line with other recent re-
evaluations of Milgram’s experiments, an engagement with the unfolding encounters between 
experimenter and participants points to the overwhelming ineffectiveness of direct orders in 
the experiments.  As noted above, this may or may not be taken as evidence of the absence of 
‘obedience’, but the wider point is that the issuing of orders simply did not work as a strategy 
for eliciting more electric shocks in the Milgram studies.  That this has been obscured for 
almost fifty years should compel social psychologists to undertake a root-and-branch re-
evaluation of the ‘obedience’ experiments which places rhetoric and interaction centre-stage. 
It should thus be apparent that any analysis that purports to present a complete 
account of dis/obedience but which fails to conceptualize the active rhetorical nature of 
language use is inherently limited, and moreover risks breaking down when specific instances 
of dis/obedience are scrutinized.  In this respect, then, it does seem striking that the study of 




dis/obedience – and of the Milgram experiments in particular – has proceeded for so long 
without attention to language and rhetoric.  The neglect of these issues within social 
psychology more generally perhaps goes some way towards explaining this lacuna, and so it 
is worth concluding by noting that the demonstrable importance of these issues within the 
Milgram experiments is suggestive of the need to address them more widely within the 
discipline as a whole.  Discursive and rhetorical psychologists have long argued that the 
neglect of the active and constructive nature of language use in laboratory experimentation 
leaves the activities and findings of experimental psychology in need of re-interpretation.  
However, actual empirical analysis of language use in the psychological laboratory has been 
rare.  If the meaning of one of social psychology’s landmark studies undergoes such a 
profound transformation when issues of language and rhetoric are foregrounded, it should 
raise fundamental questions about the foundations of the discipline as a whole. 
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1
 Milgram (1974) re-numbered some of his experimental conditions, including ‘Women as Subjects’, 
which became condition 8.  In order to ensure consistency with the archival material, the present article uses 
Milgram’s original numbering, which appears to be ordered chronologically, in which this is condition 20. 
2
 In the excerpts from these transcripts presented below, speakers are identified as E (Experimenter), T 
(Teacher) and L (Learner).  Other transcription conventions are as follows: 
((inaudible)) Double parentheses indicate comments from the transcriber. 
(11) Numbers in parentheses indicate a timed silence, with the number indicating the amount in 
seconds. 
URGH! Capitals indicate utterances that are noticeably louder than the surrounding talk.  Exclamation 
marks indicate increased urgency in the delivery of the utterance. 
I can’t, I A comma indicates a pause of less than a second. 
I- A dash indicates a sharp cut-off of the preceding utterance. 
[continue] Brackets indicate overlapping talk. 
volts. A full-stop (period) indicates a ‘stopping’ intonation, rather than the end of a grammatical 
sentence per se. 
Why? A question mark indicates a questioning intonation, rather than a grammatical question per se. 
3
 According to participant 2032’s file in the archives, she had administered the punishments as 
instructed up to the 270v shock level, but had then administered three further shocks of, respectively, 15v, 120v 
and 225v.  The last shock administered was therefore 225v, although a shock of 270v had previously been 
administered. 
4
 The experimental procedure allowed for participants to deliver the 450v shock three times, at which 
point the experimenter would draw the experimental session to a close if the participant had not successfully 
disobeyed.  Participant 2036 disobeyed having already delivered one 450v shock.  As an aside, it is worth noting 
that this contradicts Milgram’s (1974, p. 206) assertion that ‘[n]o subject who reached the 30th shock level ever 
refused to continue using it.’  This discrepancy possibly arises from a mislabelling of the archived file for 2036, 
which seems in fact to refer to a pilot participant who was fully obedient and therefore administered the 450v 
shock three times. 




                                                                                                                                                        
5
 It is worth noting that prod 4 here follows a renewed attempt at defiance by this participant, and whereas prods 
1-3 had been used during an earlier attempt to break-off from the experiment, the participant had subsequently 
gone on to administer three more shocks.  This therefore constitutes a new attempt to break-off, and prod 4 is 
thus the first prod used in this sequence.  This experimental session therefore appears to contradict Milgram’s 
(1974, p. 21) assertion that the series of prods ‘was begun anew on each occasion that the subject balked or 
showed reluctance to follow orders’. 
